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Abstract
Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected
from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than "the rest of
us"? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound "rational choice"
answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach with
endogenous preference formation the complex interactions between "moral" intrinsic
motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic "formal" controls of
opportunism are analysed. Under the assumption that judges are no better than
ordinary citizens it is shown that introducing a court system can nevertheless
prevent that the more trustworthy are driven out. It cannot be excluded, though, that
courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances.
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I. Introduction
Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach to human behavior the
economist is no longer confined to an analysis of rational behavior
relative to given preferences (and constraints). Individuals are still
modelled as standard rational decision makers. But within an indirect
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evolutionary approach the formation of the preferences underlying
rational decision making can be treated as an endogenous aspect of a
larger model in which the basic rational choice model is embedded. In
the larger model it can be analysed how evolutionary success of
individual "bearers" of preferences feeds back on the preferences
underlying their rational decision making, and vice versa.
Subsequently we shall use such an indirect evolutionary approach to
demonstrate that a court system sanctioning unfair behavior can work in
favor of the more trustworthy even if judges are no better behaved than
the population at large. Individuals who are serving as judges can be as
opportunistic as the general population and yet introducing courts can
eliminate the differential advantage of opportunists. But relying on
behavioral control through extrinsic institutionalised incentives under
specific parameter constellations can also favor the opportunists. It may
"crowd out" intrinsic, non-opportunistic motivation.
The claim that there may be such negative side effects of "economising
on love" (cf. on that Robertson 1956) through courts is directly opposed
to the thesis that the courts will protect the less opportunistic. The claim
has been frequently made ( cf. more recently in particular Frey 1997) but
as far as we know it has not been discussed in a precise non-co-operative
game model yet. The models provided subsequently do not only
demonstrate that trust in the shadow of the courts may be warranted
even if judges are no better than the population at large. They also spell
out conditions under which the legal umbrella in fact may work to the
disadvantage of the more trustworthy individuals.
More specifically, to understand the influence of "extrinsic control" on
behavior we must know what behavior would have been like without
"extrinsic motivation". Therefore the next section (II.1) recapitulates
some previous results of ours about a basic "game of trust" in which
extrinsic incentives to act "trustworthy" are lacking. Extrinsic incentives
are "added" to the model, then, by introducing a "court system" (II.2). In
the central part of the paper it is discussed whether and, if so, when
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reliance on external enforcement may eliminate the advantages of
opportunistic behavior even if judges are selected from the same
population of players whose behavior they monitor. As already
indicated, we do not dismiss the possibility, though, that introducing
formal enforcement through courts may crowd out intrinsically
motivated trustworthiness. As we shall show, if people behave non-
trustworthy frequently anyway, then the provision of the extrinsic
incentive of costly legal litigation may bring about a further decline of
trustworthiness. On the other hand, if outside the shadow of the courts
individuals behave non-trustworthy not too frequently, then introducing
extrinsic incentives can in fact prevent that the more trustworthy are
driven out. The general social climate or, more technically speaking, the
population composition as well as relative enforcement costs are crucial
for predicting the likely effects of extrinsic enforcement policies. But, as
long as judges are not biased against those who behave fairly, there are
always policies that can stabilise whatever degree of trustworthiness
there is by means of a court system (III.). Finally, we put our discussion
into a somewhat broader perspective (IV.).
II. Basic modelling and background
II.1. Some previous results
In our evolutionary model pairs of players of two types are drawn from
a potentially infinite population and randomly matched to play a "basic
game of trust". With equal probability each player of a pair is assigned the
role of a first or that of a second mover respectively. In the role of the
second mover the intrinsically motivated fair type will fairly reward a
trustful first move of her co-player while the extrinsically motivated












r         1>r>s>0, 1/2<r
Figure 1
Player 1´s is the first payoff while the second of the payoffs at the end
nodes accrues to the second player. The parameters r, s, 0, 1 are payoffs
that refer to extrinsic incentives. They are based on some "objective"
aspects of the real world like resources. These are directly related to
evolutionary success. For convenience it is assumed that the subjective
preferences over the objective parameter values can be represented by a
scale with the same numerical payoffs.
The parameter m does not represent any external factor. It has no direct
relationship to evolutionary success either. It is a subjective intrinsic
motivational factor. For convenience we refer to it as the "conscience
parameter" or more succinctly the "conscience" of the player. Since
behavior of the second moving player is fully determined by the
relationship between 1+m and r we initially shall restrict attention to
merely two parameter values of m: m=m̄, with m̄ + 1 > r, and m=m, with
m+1 < r. In short, m<r-1< m̄. Malevolent intrinsic motivation is excluded
by m̄≤0. Later on, when discussing a variant of our model in which the
behavior of the second mover is motivated in a more complex way we
shall allow for continuous variation of the conscience parameter over the
whole interval [m, m̄].
Given the payoff structure described it should be obvious why we refer
to the move N as a move of "no trust", to T as a move of "trust", to E as
"exploitation" and to R as "reward". A rational player with m=m̄ who,
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due to a lack of sufficient intrinsic motivation, will exploit a trusting first
mover is referred to as being of the "non trustworthy" or " unfair m̄-
type". A player with m=m who fairly rewards trust received is described
as being of the "trustworthy" or "fair m-type".
Putting the game of trust into an evolutionary perspective we assume
that both types, in unbiased random matching, are drawn from a pool of
players with a population composition characterised by the fraction
p∈[0, 1] of trustworthy m-types. The type composition parameter as well
as the rules of the game are common knowledge among the players.
Before matching the players do not know, though, whether they are
going to play in the role of the first or in the role of the second mover.
They are assigned their roles as first and second movers, respectively, by
a chance move with equal probability for both outcomes.
We must distinguish two fundamentally different cases: complete and
incomplete type information. Complete type information prevails if after
matching their types are common knowledge among the players. Then a



























In this game it is commonly known among the players which type, either
m or m̄, has been chosen for each of the players, that is they know mi,
i=1, 2. Under this information condition it is intuitively plausible that
being of the non-trustworthy type is a disadvantage. The unfair types
will receive s whenever they end up in the role of the second mover. The
fair types, however, will encounter trust whenever they move second
and then receive r. Since r>s and since in the role of the first mover both
types of players fare equal it is obvious that in the game of figure 2 only
a population composition as characterised by p=1 can be evolutionarily
stable in the sense that there is a small neighborhood Np of p such that
for any population composition p´∈Np the other type is less successful.
Thus, once an evolutionarily stable population composition is reached it
cannot be overthrown by an "invasion" of a small number of mutants.
Since mutation is regarded as a small number phenomenon this captures
a basic intuition of "stability".
In the case of incomplete type information the players remain ignorant
of their respective types after matching. Collapsing the two chance
moves determining the type of player 1 and of player 2 respectively into
one, the remaining random event is the assignment of the roles of first
and second mover. The following graph of figure 3 shows the basic





































































































We have studied the evolutionary process based on this game in some
detail elsewhere (cf. Güth and Kliemt 1994). Intuitively it should be quite
obvious, though, what the likely outcome of the process is if types
cannot be distinguished at all: After an initial choice of T, non-
trustworthy types fare better than trustworthy ones in the role of the
second mover. In that role the m̄-types receive 1 as measured in
"objective" payoff while the m-types end up merely with r. Therefore, for
all population compositions for which T is the rational choice of first
movers the parameter p characterising the fraction of trustworthy types
should decrease. For population compositions for which the rational
choice of first movers is N both types indiscriminately receive s. We can
differentiate between types, though, if we allow for a small minimum
probability that players commit mistakes in executing their rational
plans as required by the concept of a limit evolutionarily stable strategy
or, for short, the LESS-concept (cf. Selten 1988). Then, with positive
probability, occasional choices of T occur even though the rational plan
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dictates to play N in the role of the first mover. If such "trembles" prevail
the non-trustworthy types of players have an advantage over the
trustworthy ones even for population compositions p for which showing
trust, T, is not the first movers´ rational choice. Only non-trustworthy
types should be expected to survive -- at least eventually -- and only the
m̄-monomorphic population with p=0 is evolutionarily stable according
to the LESS-concept.
As long as types are completely indistinguishable and first movers
choose T with some positive minimum probability, the non-trustworthy
type should "drive out" the trustworthy one. Intuitively it should also be
clear that this result might change if first movers can to some extent
distinguish between second movers of different types before they decide
between T and N. In fact, if a costly detection technology of limited
reliability reveals information about the second mover´s type before the
first mover must make his initial move there may be two evolutionarily
stable population compositions (cf. Güth and Kliemt 1995). Depending
on the costs and the reliability of advance type detection we get either
p=0 or 1>p>0 (and in the limit of zero costs and full reliability even p=1).
The following figure 4 sums up the previous results on the intermediate
case in which some type information is available at some cost. It shall
serve as a bench mark for our subsequent discussion of the influence of
the courts on behavior and the population composition. The triangle in
the graphic illustrates the population dynamics, i. e. the direction in
which p moves in all likelihood, for alternative values of the parameter
C´ and alternative initial values of p. C´ measures the costs of using a
technology of given reliability for detecting trustworthy types before
action. For each C one can calculate thresholds p(C´) and p̄(C´). If
p<p(C´), then using the detection technology is too costly. Rational
players will rather do without any specific type information than pay C´
to acquire it. The game will basically be the one depicted in figure 3 and
the share p of trustworthy individuals in the population will decrease
until p=0. If  p̄(C´)> p > p(C´) then usage of the detection technology is
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worthwhile and will exert selective pressure in favor of the trustworthy
until p̄(C´) is reached. For p > p̄(C´) exploitation occurs so rarely that
players prefer to incur the remaining risk of being exploited to further
reducing it at cost C´. Therefore, for p > p̄(C´) players will decide on not
acquiring specific type information. They will thus play the game of
figure 3 again. The population share p of trustworthy types will decrease
until p = p̄(C´).
As long as costs C are positive the non-trustworthy will never be driven
out of the population completely. The population can become mono-
morphically trustworthy only if information is costles and thus the
previously mentioned limiting case of complete type information
emerges. We shall focus here on the more realistic and more central case
of non-zero detection costs (cf. for another defence of the importance of
that case Frank 1988). For C´≠0 we assume that detection costs are
sufficiently low and specific type information sufficiently reliable such
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Figure 4
As remarked before the constellation described in figure 4 forms the
bench mark to which we shall compare the situation emerges if the
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courts cast their shadow on interactions like the basic game of trust. In
the next step we shall introduce courts to our formal model.
II.2. The basic model
In the model subsequently studied the costly information technology of
limited reliability is substituted by a costly litigation procedure of
limited reliability. Instead of the ability to detect their co-player´s type
before moving, first movers are able to rely on the external policing
device after observing the outcome of the game. Players who have been
exploited, can appeal to an "arbitrator" or "judge". More specifically, we









































To keep things reasonably simple, figure 5 does not present the complete
graph of the game. Since the first mover´s type is irrelevant for the
outcome of the basic game of trust we just present one of the subgames
emerging after the roles of first and second mover have been assigned
and the type of the first mover has been determined. In this subgame
player 1 is assigned the role of the first and player 2 that of the second
mover. The first mover knows this and his own type (which is irrelevant
for his rational play anyway).
The subgame presented here captures the essential part of the
interaction. It starts with nature´s choice of the type of the first mover´s
co-player. Afterwards the first mover makes his initial move. After a
non-trusting initial move, independently of the second mover´s type, the
result is the same as in the basic game of trust. After a trusting first move
the second mover may decide on exploitation or on fair reward. In the
simple game of trust this move would be determined completely by the
second mover´s type. The m-type would fairly reward trust while the m̄-
type would choose to exploit the first mover´s trust. However, now, the
second mover anticipates that, after E, the first mover is going to move
again. The first mover can either quit, Q, and thus give in to exploitation,
or he can appeal, A, and thus try to reach restitution.
The consequences of each of these decisions depend on the decision of a
"judge". "Nature" in a chance move chooses a judge from the same pool
of individuals from which the players of the game of trust are drawn.
With probability p the judge is a "trustworthy" or "fair" one. Such a fair
judge upon appeal will decide on restitution if the second mover chose
the exploitative alternative E. With probability 1-p the judge will,
however, be of the unfair type. An unfair judge with probability q,
(II.1) 0<q<1,
decides on restitution -- that is, she acts like a fair one -- and with
complementary probability 1-q decides against the plaintiff.
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The judge controlling opportunistic behavior may seem like a "jack of
the box". At first sight we are solving the problem of opportunism on the
level of the game of trust by assuming it away on the level of norm-
enforcement. However, in the model discussed here the judge is
randomly drawn from the same population as the players. No selection
effect is assumed to operate. Judges are not more trustworthy than non-
judges. Neither would they necessarily play the role of the judge for
more than one round of play. As far as these factors are concerned we do
not make special assumptions about judges. We assume, though, that
being a judge on any round of play is neutral with respect to
evolutionary success of the players adopting that role. We can therefore
treat the interaction as a two player game in which some of the outcomes
depend on the type of the judge -- and thus on the population
composition -- but not on any strategic choices affecting the judge´s
payoff.
Since, what judges do, can directly be derived from their type and the
reliability parameter of the non-trustworthy type the parameters p and q
are crucial for characterising judges´ likely behavior. Since p and q are
assumed to be commonly known, players can predict the likely conse-
quences of appealing to a judge. The probability to encounter a non-
trustworthy judge is just the same as that for being matched with a non-
trustworthy co-player. However, since as assumed here q>0 applies,
even the non-trustworthy judge may decide on restitution. This can be
made plausible by the following line of argument: In their role of the
judge the non-trustworthiness of players amounts to their unwillingness
to invest sufficiently in the investigation of the case. Shirking on the
judge´s job they do reach the correct verdict only with reduced
reliability.
The unreliable judge will not necessarily decide against restitution. With
some probability q she will rather decide like the trustworthy m-type of
judge, that is, in favor of the exploited individual. Therefore the
probability to reach restitution from a judge after being exploited is p --
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the probability to encounter a trustworthy judge -- plus (1-p)q -- the
probability to encounter a non-trustworthy judge who with probability q
nevertheless decides on restitution. This explains
(II.2) w=p + (1-p)q.
The latter, of course, implies 1-w=(1-p)(1-q).
The parameter ∂ indicates how strongly extrinsic enforcement affects
intrinsic motivation. In principle ∂ could adopt any value in the closed
interval [0, 1]. We shall discuss only the two pure or extreme cases in
which ∂ adopts one of the limits of the interval; that is
(II.3) ∂ ∈ {0, 1}.
If ∂=0 prevails, going to court has a decisive effect on the second mover´s
perception of the situation. After the first mover engages her in a legal
dispute she evaluates the situation exclusively according to "extrinsic
standards". The first mover´s second move of appealing to an external
judge suspends all "inner" feelings of "guilt" she otherwise might have
endorsed because of her exploitative behavior. The matter is "framed" as
a purely legal dispute. This case will be studied in section III.1.
In view of the pervasiveness of "framing effects" (cf. Kahneman and
Tversky 1984, Lindenberg 1983) the previous assumption is certainly
plausible. Nevertheless, the second mover´s feelings may be less affected
by being sued. As indicated before, rather than considering all possible
intermediate values we focus on the other extreme case that going to
court does not at all affect the "inner feelings". This leads to the case ∂=1
to be studied for a dichotomous type space in section III.2 and for a
continuous type space in section III.3.
For our analysis we assume that ∂ is common knowledge. Moreover, we
presuppose that ∂ is uniform across all interactions between all
randomly matched pairs of players.
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Finally, the variable C measuring the influence of the costs of using the
legal procedure on individual utility is assumed to be negative:
(II.4) C<0.
III. Trustworthiness in the shadow of the court
In the game of figure 5, initially, only the second mover knows her type.
The first mover when deciding between T and N merely knows the
population composition parameter p. However, at his second
information set, the first mover knows that T and E must have been
played. Conceivably he could infer the type of the second mover from
this information. This would be the case if only the m̄-type would choose
E in the role of a second mover. Then the first mover when having to
decide between Q and A would know that with probability 0 he would
be at the left and with probability 1 at the right decision node.
Since prospects are completely identical for player 1 at both nodes of his
second information set the subjective probability of being at the right or
at the left node is irrelevant for rational play, however. We can therefore
disregard the signalling aspects of the game of figure 5. The expectation
after A is (1-w)C + wr while after Q it is 0, regardless. We need to
consider only the relation  between (1-w)C + wr and 0.
If (1-w)C + wr<0 applies player 1 does not plan to appeal. Since this is
common knowledge among the players the dominated alternative, A, of
appealing can be deleted from figure 5. The game of figure 6 emerges. As
can easily be checked this game corresponds to one of the four
information sets for the first mover in figure 3. Thus, the complete tree of
this game would be equivalent to the game without external enforce-
ment as presented in figure 3 above. Therefore all the results sketched in





























Subsequently the main focus is on parameter constellations under which
the external enforcement mechanism is in fact used. In dealing with the
likely dynamics and stable values of p under various constellations we
shall distinguish between the case ∂=0, appealing to the court suppresses
feelings of "guilt" completely, and the case ∂=1 in which the extrinsic
motivational effects of court intervention are merely superimposed on
the pre-existing motivational structure. Intermediate values ∂ ∈ (0, 1)
could be studied along the same lines. But, since this would not lead to
deeper additional insights, it suffices to deal with merely two extreme
values of ∂.
Rather than studying the continuous variation of ∂ over the whole
interval [0, 1] we shall analyse a continuous variation of m over the
whole interval [m, m̄]. We shall refer to this, as the "continuous" case as
opposed to the "dichotomous" case with mutant space {m, m̄}. In fact, we
use the distinction between these two cases to introduce a more
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fundamental further one. The two cases differ not merely with respect to
their mutant spaces. As discussed here, they lead to two different models
which, though formally similar, are based on fundamentally different
concepts of trustworthiness. In the dichotomous case trustworthiness is a
"motivational" concept. Individuals are trustworthy or they are not,
pending on the strength |m| of their conscience. In the continuous case
trustworthiness becomes a "behavioral" rather than a motivational
concept. Individuals are deemed trustworthy or non-trustworthy
according to their expected rational choices which depend not only on
the strength of their conscience but also on the population composition.
III.1. Dichotomous case ∂=0
In the preceding comments on figure 6 we have dealt already with (1-
w)C + wr < 0. Assume therefore
(III.1) (1-w)C + wr > 0.
For all p fulfilling this relation the first mover plans on choosing A.
Though, conceivably, the value of the parameter m might differentially
affect strategic choices it does not in the present case. Unless the
condition for appeal is reversed both types of players face exactly the
same strategic incentives if assigned the role of the second mover. For,
after being sued, the second mover regardless of her type "frames" the
interaction as a purely legal matter.
Thus, if ∂=0, the anticipated choice of A suppresses all intrinsic
motivational factors like "guilt" or a "bad conscience". Moreover, the
parameter m is not directly related to evolutionary success. It can be left
out of account in calculating the contribution of the results of a play to
success in evolutionary competition. Therefore, since type or intrinsic
motivation does not affect choice if ∂=0 prevails and A is chosen,
evolutionary success of both types of players must be the same. Finally,
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payoff in the role of the arbitrator is independent of the type of the
player as well.
In sum, if in case ∂=0 condition III.1 applies, we cannot differentiate
between m-types and m̄-types with respect to their likely evolutionary
success. Any population composition parameter p implying appeal can
be weakly stable since for all p∈ [0, 1] there exists a generic
neighborhood Np of p relative to [0, 1] such that for p´∈Np all types are
equally successful.
This argument does not change if players in the role of the second mover
anticipate that exploited first movers once in a while fail to appeal. For, if
the first mover appeals, then in all generic cases, both types of a second
mover face the same incentives and thus behave the same way. For
sufficiently small trembles leading to a choice of T either both types
strictly prefer R or both types strictly prefer E. Therefore, if players in the
role of the first mover have a sufficient incentive to choose A no
systematic differentiation between types can take place and thus no
crowding out effect can emerge.
In case of population composition parameters p for which Q is rational,
the game of figure 6 is played. As we know from our above discussion
the m̄-monomorphic population characterised by p=0 is the only stable
one in this game.
The following figure sums up the essentials of this discussion of the
stability and dynamics of p in the dichotomous case ∂=0:
0 1        pAppealNo Appeal p˚
attraction set     set of weakly
of p=0               stable p
Figure 7
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The critical value p° separating the region of "no appeal", Q, from that of
appeal, A, can be derived by solving (1-w)C + wr=0 for p,
(1-w)C + wr=0




(III.2) p° :=  
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r) .
The first mover should appeal, A, if p>p°=  
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  , and he should
not appeal, Q, if p<p°=  
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  .
Note p° =  
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  = 
-q
1-qr-C
r-C  . Thus, p°, is negative if 
q
1-q r > -C. Of
course, if p°<0 then p>p° for all p. First movers will appeal for all
population compositions p rendering them weakly stable. Thus, the set
of weakly stable strategies can comprise the whole interval [0, 1] in
figure 7.
On the other hand, p° is always smaller than 1. Therefore the attraction
set of p=0 corresponding to a monomorphic population composition of
unfair m̄-types can never be exhaustive. Thus, even though only p=0 can
be  stable in the sense of the LESS-concept if 
q
1-q r < -C, there are always
non-monomorphic population compositions that are weakly stable.
If p∈(p°, 1) and thus first movers after being exploited appeal then the
courts play a role. After play they have the relevant type information
and use it to the advantage of the trustworthy. Though the courts cannot
"crowd in" trustworthy types they can keep them from being crowded
out. Recalling our bench mark case with the "old" detection costs C´ this
is particularly relevant for p > p̄(C´)≥p˚. In this realm p can be rendered
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weakly stable by court intervention. On the other hand, the fact that
merely p=0 can be (limit)evolutionarily stable is not due to a crowding
out effect of the relevant kind, quite to the contrary. If the trustworthy
loose out for p∈(p̄(C´), p°) they are not crowded out by the courts. As the
previous discussion of the game depicted in figure 3 showed the
trustworthy would have been eliminated anyway under the prevailing
information conditions. And, this lack of information is not the courts´
fault, so to say.  Let us see whether these  results change for ∂=1.
III.2 Dichotomous case ∂=1
Consider again the game of figure 5. However, now assume ∂=1. As
before, player 1 does never intentionally choose to appeal iff p<p° (or wr
+ (1-w)C < 0). After deleting the respective moves, the game is reduced
to that of figure 6 to which our previous results apply. It suffices to
analyse the game under the assumption p>p° implying that first movers
appeal after exploitation.
III.2.1. Rational play
Note first, that the parameter m does not affect the first moving player´s
second decision. If, as assumed here, p>p° then the first mover indepen-
dently of his type appeals. This must be taken into account by the second
mover in her choice between fair reward, R, and exploitation, E. The
payoff expectation after R is r while after E it is w(r+m+C)+(1-w)(1+m).
The second mover prefers E over R iff
 w(r+m+C)+(1-w)(1+m) > r
(III.3) m > (r-1)(1-q) - Cq + p(1-q)(1-r-C)
Let α:=(r-1)(1-q) - Cq and β:=(1-q)(1-r-C) and ω(p):=α+βp.
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Since 0≤q<1 and 1>r>0>C, obviously β>0. Therefore ω is a positive
(affine) linear function of p. It can be used to reformulate III.3 more
succinctly yielding:
The second mover prefers E over R iff
(III.4) m > ω(p).
Note that 1+m<r and C<0 imply w(r+m+C)+(1-w)(1+m)< r. Thus, for the
trustworthy m-type the condition m< ω(p) holds good for all population
compositions. For the dichotomous case we have m∈{m, m̄}, with m<r-
1< m̄ and can therefore describe behavior of the two types of second
movers in the following way:
The trustworthy m-type chooses fair reward, R, for all population 
compositions.
The non-trustworthy m̄-type chooses fair reward, R, if m̄< ω(p).
The non-trustworthy m̄-type chooses E if m̄>ω(p).
In short, if p>p°, and thus the courts are used, then exploitative behavior
E will be observed only if m̄> ω(p).
Let us finally turn to the first move of the first moving player. His
decisions to trust, T, or not to trust, N, are type-independent. If the
condition for appeal, p>p°, is fulfilled N can be rational only if m̄>ω(p).
For, if  m̄<ω(p) applies, T is always rewarded by R and thus rational.
Provided that p>p° applies we have:
(i) m̄<ω(p)
⇒ the first mover prefers T over N.
(ii) m̄> ω(p) and pr + (1-p) ((1-w)C + wr)) > s
⇒ the first mover prefers T over N.
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(iii) m̄> ω(p) and pr + (1-p) ((1-w)C + wr)) <  s
⇒ the first mover prefers N over T.
Analysing the second condition for preferring N over T stated in (iii)
yields
p(r) + (1-p) ((1-w)C + wr)) < s











r-C >0 and thus η<1. Moreover η<0 iff q> 
s-C
r-C. Thus,
independently of the population composition T is chosen if q> 
s-C
r-C. Note
also that p(2-p) is monotonically increasing over the interval (0, 1). The
threshold beyond which the condition for trust rather than no trust is
fulfilled is p = 1 - [1- η]1/2 since p(2-p) = η ⇔ p = 1 ± [1- η]1/2. Thus the
second condition for showing non-trustful behavior as stated in (iii) is
fulfilled for
(III.6) 0 ≤ p <  1 - [1- η]1/2.
Let us summarise:
For η<0 Τ is chosen for all p;
For η ≥ 0
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p >  1 - [1- η]1/2 ⇒ Τ is chosen;
p <  1 - [1- η]1/2  ⇒ N is chosen if m̄> ω(p).
We can now fully describe solution play in case ∂=1. Basically, if p>p°
we have to deal with the following cases (where differentiation between
types concerns only play in the role of the second mover since types
behave identically in the role of the first mover):
Case 1
If η<0 or  p >  1 - [1- η]1/2
then for all population compositions fulfilling m̄> ω(p)
solution play is (T, A; E) for m=m̄ and (T, A; R) for m=m.
Case 2
If η>0  and  0 ≤ p <  1 - [1- η]1/2
then for all population compositions fulfilling m̄> ω(p)
solution play is (N, A; E) for m=m̄ and (N, A; R) for m=m.
Case 3
For all population compositions fulfilling m̄<ω(p)
solution play is (T, A; R) for both m-types.
III.2.2. Evolutionary dynamics and stability
Only different behavior in the role of the second mover can lead to
differential evolutionary success of different types. Otherwise types
behave and fare the same way. Therefore, in discussing evolutionary
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dynamics and stability, it suffices to focus on behavior in the role of the
second mover.
Moreover, as stated before the game of figure 6 emerges if p<p°. Second
movers behave according to type then. Therefore, p decreases for
population compositions p with p<p° as long as there is a positive
probability for occasional choices of T. In short, if the courts are not used,
p will tend to decrease. Clearly, this does not amount to crowding out by
the courts. But the courts not being used do not enhance the survival
prospects of the more trustworthy either.
Only if p>p˚ the courts are used and can conceivably have some impact
on survival prospects. Neglecting the relationship between p and p(C´)
as well as p̄(C´) for the time being we may restrict attention to
differential success of different types´ play in the role of the second
mover when  p>p°. On the one hand,  there are population compositions
p for which both types of players in view of  m̄<ω(p) choose R. Again,
since both types behave the same way, nothing can differentiate between
them. On the other hand, there are population compositions with
m̄>ω(p) for which the two types of players behave differently in the role
of the second mover. Since they behave differently types can differ in
evolutionary success then. -- To facilitate orientation let us first give a
kind of bird´s eye view of the argument.
Recall, that ω  is strictly monotonic. Therefore ω−1 exists yielding a






For p>p̄ the m̄-type second movers will choose R rather than E and thus
behave the same way as the m-types in the role of the second mover. For
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p<p̄ the m̄-type second movers will choose E rather than R and thus
behave differently from m-type second movers.
The following graphical illustrations of population dynamics for p∈[0,
p˚) or p∈(p˚, 1]-- Figure 8a -- and p∈(p˚, p̄) or p∈(p̄, 1] -- Figure 8b -- give
an overview over claims to be justified in the subsequent analytical
discussion of cases and sub-cases.
0                p              p˚                           1        p
Attraction set of         Set of weakly
p=0                                stable p
Figure 8a
Attraction set of         Set of weakly
p=0                                stable p
0               p˚           p                             1        p
Figure 8b
Figure 8a
Starting with figure 8a, i.e. with the case p˚>p̄, we must consider p∈[0,
p˚) as well as p∈(p˚, 1]. As noted before, if p<p˚ this leads back to the
game of figure 6 (leaving out the relation to p̄(C´), p(C´) completely. We
can state therefore: If p∈(0, p˚) then p decreases.
Obviously, the parameter constellation p˚>p̄ depicted in figure 8a is such
that p˚<p implies p>p̄. We therefore have p>p° and p>p̄. In this case
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m̄<ω(p) and thus both types act fairly if assigned the role of the second
mover. All players trust and their trust is met by fair reward. Fair and
unfair types behave the same way in the role of the second mover. Thus,
for population compositions p∈(p˚, 1] -- i. e. p satisfying p>p° and p>p̄ --
there will neither be a systematic increase nor a systematic decrease of p.
Figure 8b
For parameter constellations like those depicted in figure 8b where  p˚<p̄
we must consider p∈(p˚, p̄) as well as p∈(p̄, 1]. The former amounts to
p>p° and  p<p̄ and the latter to p>p° and p>p̄.
p>p° and p>p̄:
This case has been dealt with already in the discussion of figure 8a. We
know that under these conditions p neither systematically increases nor
systematically decreases. It may be noted in passing, though, that
ω(0)=α+β0=(r-1)(1-q) - qC>m̄ implies ω(p)>m̄ or p>p̄ for all p, since ω is
monotonically increasing in p.
p>p° and  p<p̄:
The premise p<p̄ is equivalent to m̄>ω(p) which in turn is equivalent to
w(r+m̄+C)+(1-w)(1+m̄)>r. Recall we assumed m̄≤0, C<0. Therefore
m̄>ω(p) implies that the payoff components directly related to evolutio-
nary success fulfil w(r+C)+(1-w)(1)>r. The m̄-type´s "objective" payoff,
w(r+C)+(1-w)(1), is larger than the "objective" payoff, r, of the m-type.
Consequently, the population share, p, of trustworthy m-types
decreases. For η<0, T is chosen and the argument applies as long as
p>p°. For η>0 the population share p of trustworthy m-types declines
until p <  1 - [1- η]1/2. The very moment this threshold is reached case 2
of the above characterisation of solution play emerges and the ESS
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concept itself does not further differentiate between types. But, under
the assumption that T is chosen at least as an occasional chance move
with small but positive probability, case 2 basically can be treated like
case 1. Since the two types behave differently if m̄>ω(p), an occasional
move T may be expected to bring about differential evolutionary
success. Therefore p should decrease according to the LESS-concept. We
can thus state: For any population composition p∈(p˚, p̄) the share p of
trustworthy types decreases until p=p°. As the discussion of figure 8a
shows p=p˚ is merely transient and p will decline beyond -- again the
general disclaimer that the possible interference of the costly detection
technology is left out of account, of course, applies.
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that both, p<p̄ as well as p<p°,
are sufficient for bringing about a decrease of p. Since either will do, the
maximum of the two sufficient conditions is all that matters:
For p<max {p̄, p°} types behave differently and the share of trustworthy
types decreases.
For p>max {p̄, p°} types behave the same way and the population









In view of figure 9 the following observations about evolutionary
stability are obvious:
max {p̄, p°}>0 then the population composition characterised by
p=0 is stable in the sense of the LESS-concept.
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p>max {p̄, p°} then the population composition characterised by
p is weakly stable.
Substituting the definitions of the terms we get:
max { 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)+qC
(1-q)(1-r-C)  , 
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  }>0 ⇒ 
p=0 is stable (in the LESS sense)
and
all p>max { 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)+qC
(1-q)(1-r-C)  , 
qr+C(1-q)




(1-q)(1-r-C)  , 
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  }<0 ⇒
all population compositions are weakly stable.
The result of our discussion of the dichotomous case ∂=1 is the
following: Given certain parameter constellations, the shadow of the
courts can counteract the tendency towards eliminating the trustworthy
from the basic evolutionary game of trust. For this result to emerge it is
not necessary that judges are more trustworthy than the population at
large. A generic attraction set of p=0 may emerge for certain values of
punishment C, though. But for p<p˚ the decrease in trustworthy
individuals is definitely not brought about by the courts. Rather a
general lack of intrinsic motivation in society induces the "decline of
morals" since it also affects judges´ behavior. A crowding out effect in
the proper sense of that term could be conceivably observed only for
p∈(p˚, p̄)≠∅. Only for p from the interval (p˚, p̄) first movers do in fact
appeal to the courts after being exploited. But crowding out also
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presupposes that a non-monomorphic population of trustworthy and
non-trustworthy individuals with a limit evolutionarily stable popu-
lation composition parameter p∈(p˚, p̄) and p=p̄(C´)>0 has emerged (cf.
on this the discussion of figure 4 above). Only if this applies can we say
that the trustworthy are driven out through the influence of the courts.
According to the previous line of argument, the possibility that
crowding out may emerge must be taken into account when considering
policy measures like that of imposing a court system on a realm of
human interaction previously unregulated. However, an exclusive focus
on this mere possibility would lead to a very distorted view of possible
policy measures. Rejecting legal enforcement by a court system simply
because it may conceivably have negative side effects on trustworthiness
is unwise. The possible positive effects of courts must not be neglected. --
As we shall see next, if judges in their role are not biased in favor of the
non-trustworthy, then introducing extrinsic enforcement can render any
population composition weakly stable provided that the costs of legal
litigation are suitably set.
III.2.3. When the courts can prevent elimination of the trustworthy
As noted before, if max { p̄, p°}<0, then all population compositions are
weakly stable. Moreover, if max {p̄, p°}<0, then, as far as overt behavior
is concerned, we live in a "morally perfect world". Under these condi-
tions all actors independently of their type and thus of the strength of
their conscience rationally trust and intend to retribute fairly while after
and occasional mistaken unfair move of second movers, as first movers
they plan on appealing to the courts. In short, all players plan to choose
according to (T, A; R). In such situations the introduction of courts as
such can guarantee that all players are well behaved even though there
is no selection effect operating in favor of judges who behave better than
"the rest of us". Clearly, from a policy point of view, measures to bring
29
about this situation deserve special attention. So let us study possible
such measures in some detail.
Both, p̄ as well as p° depend on the cost parameter C. At the same time C
is the crucial policy variable when considering the introduction of a
court enforcement system. At least conceivably, policy makers should be
able to choose it as seems fit. This raises the question under what
circumstances there is an interval from which C can be chosen such that
max {p̄, p°}<0.
Now,
p˚<0 ⇔   
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  = 
-q
1-qr-C
r-C   < 0  ⇔  
q
1-q r > -C ;
then for all population compositions A is chosen.
p̄<0  ⇔ 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)+qC
(1-q)(1-r-C)  <0  ⇔  -C > 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)
q  ;
then for all population compositions R is chosen which, of course,
implies that the choice of T is rational for all population compositions as
well.
The interval ( 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)
q ,  
q
1-q r) of cost parameters guaranteeing (T, A;
R) to be rational is non-empty iff
 
q









which is fulfilled in any case for r, q> 
1
2. Thus, if r, q >
1
2, there are C such
that -C ∈ ( 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)
q ,  
q
1-q r). In figure 1 above r > 
1
2 was already
imposed. As in the parallel case of analyses of the standard prisoner´s
dilemma we required for the basic game of trust, that it should not be
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better for the players to take turns in being exploited rather than playing
fair twice. Thus the crucial additional requirement is q> 
1
2. In fact, q≥ 
1
2
does as well. Therefore, whenever shirking of judges would mean that
they simply use an unbiased random mechanism there would always be
cost parameters C such that the court system exerts no evolutionary
drive at all while inducing fair behavior throughout.
A wise regulator intending "to make the world a better place" would
want to choose such values of C. Doing this, she would also be assured
that the court system would not exert a crowding out effect itself. As far
as the regulator´s range of choices is concerned, much depends, though,
on what shirking of non-trustworthy judges amounts to. If there is
merely a slightly reduced reliability q, which is close to 1, say q=1-ε with
1/2>>ε >0, then practically all C will do. For,  
m̄+(1-r)(1-1+ε)
1-ε  → m̄≤0  if ε
→ 0, while 
1-ε
1-1+ε r grows indefinitely if ε → 0.
As long as we can sufficiently trust individuals when adopting the role
of a judge, court intervention will affect behavior, and only behavior. For
q close to 1, any population composition can be weakly stable if C is
appropriately chosen. The latter is not a big "if" for q close to 1, however.
A very high value of the parameter q could also be interpreted as
expressing the fact that less of a conscience is necessary to overcome
temptations in the role of a judge than in the role of an ordinary player.
There is a threshold other than r-1 telling apart unreliable and reliable
judges then. In particular, rewards and temptations directly related to
performance may be systematically lowered by tenured positions of
judges, fixed salaries etc. Such asymmetries in costs and systematic
differences of behavior in low cost as opposed to high cost situations
might be exploited in policies influencing q. One may also have some
second thoughts about how decision rules for juries functioning as
judges could influence q and, perhaps, improve performance. However,
such considerations go  against the grain of the present argument which,
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of course, tries to avoid any assumption that judges behave differently
from the rest of the population and yet courts can improve performance.
Let us note, though, that the story changes fundamentally if the shirking
of judges leads to q<1/2. In particular, if q<<1/2 then the non-
trustworthy judges are strongly biased towards the exploiters. If q
becomes sufficiently small the interval for C becomes empty. Not
surprisingly, with such judges there cannot be a court system stabilising
universally fair behavior and eliminating the evolutionary advantage of
the unfair types in a world in which type information is lacking. Of
course, as we have seen the opposite is true as well. If sufficiently fair
judges for some exogenous reason or other exist, initially, then one can
stabilise co-operative behavior throughout and thus stop any
evolutionary pressure favoring the non-trustworthy by introducing a
court system with a suitably chosen cost parameter.
It may finally be noted that the previous argument applies for all m̄≤0.
We could thus make the following claim: As long as judges are not
biased towards the unfair -- that is, as long as q≥1/2 -- and as long as
players are not intrinsically malevolent -- that is, as long as  m̄≤0 -- one
can always find suitable C such that all population compositions are
weakly stable and rational play universally conforms with (T, A; R).
To see this in some detail, note
ω(0)=(r-1)(1-q) - qC > 0  ⇔ -C> 
(1-q)(1-r)
q .




1-q r) of cost parameters C for which reward, R,
and appeal, A, can be guaranteed to be the rational choice independently
of both m and p and thus for all conceivable types and population
compositions is non-empty iff
q
1-q r >  
(1-q)(1-r)





which is again fulfilled for r, q>
1
2. In fact, again it suffices if for at least
one of the two parameters r, q the strict inequality holds. Relying on the
above assumption of r>1/2 again, we can allow for q≥1/2 and thus for
an unbiased random choice on the judges´ side.













1-q r) ⊆ ( 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)
q ,  
q
1-q r).
Since for C with -C∈( 
m̄+(1-r)(1-q)
q ,  
q
1-q r) all p are weakly stable, this
demonstrates the claim raised above.
In the final discussion we shall come back to the preceding
considerations. But, as announced in our introductory remarks, let us
turn first to the behavioral as opposed to the motivational interpretation
of trustworthiness. This interpretation suggests a fundamentally
different outlook on the problems so far discussed. Thus, our subsequent
discussion of the case of a continuous variation of m is not merely some
extension of the former analysis but rather a complementary approach. It
would be easy to deal with the dichotomous case for ∂=0 and ∂=1 in the
same way. Yet, since these extensions are straightforward, we are
content to let it rest with that and to outline the argument merely for one
case.
III.3. Continuous variation of m
In the preceding discussion trustworthiness is still characterised in terms
of the incentive structure of the original "basic game of trust". Whether
or not an individual is regarded as a trustworthy type depends merely
on the relationship between m and r-1. In the original game of trust this
makes good sense since rational behavior in the position of a second
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mover is determined independently of the population composition.
Rational behavior in the role of the second mover and type completely
coincide. For all population compositions p the trustworthy m-type
chooses R while the non-trustworthy m̄-type chooses E. However, if the
game is to be played in the shadow of the courts, it may well happen
that type and behavior diverge for some p.
Though it is true that m-types independently of the population
composition will always choose R, m̄-types, expecting to be sued, should
choose R instead of E if m̄<ω(p). Due to 0≥m̄ and C<0 relation III.3
implies m̄<ω(1). But m̄<ω(p) may also hold good for p<1. For such
population compositions, p, m̄-types like m-types choose R. For  m̄-types
behavior and type can diverge. In the shadow of the courts behaviorally
monomorphic populations of players at the same time may be non-
monomorphic in their type composition.
More generally, if p´ denotes the fraction of players who choose R in the
role of the second mover and p, as before, denotes the fraction of types
deemed trustworthy according to the original criterion m<r-1, then
without the shadow of the courts p´=p would be guaranteed. But if the
courts cast their shadow on the original game of trust p´≠p may well
emerge. In particular, p´=1 and p<1 is possible. Then, in the behavioral
sense of expected play, all players are trustworthy even though p<1.
In the shadow of the courts, what is a sufficiently strong conscience m to
affect behavior varies with the population composition. This suggests that
we interpret trustworthiness in terms of expected behavior. It becomes
dependent on behavioral expectations and thus on the population
composition as characterised by p. In short, trustworthiness is no longer
a motivational concept going along with type as such but rather a
behavioral one based on strategic rationality.
We would not treat judges like ordinary citizens would we not apply the
behavioral concept of trustworthiness to the judges as well. But then we
must change the view that m̄-judges are non-trustworthy independently
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of their own likely behavior as players and thus independently of the
population composition. According to this view m̄-judges decided on
restitution with some fixed probability q<1. Even if the shirking judges
due to q<<1/2 were prone to favor the unfair very strongly they did so
independently of which behavioral pattern prevailed in the population.
Now the "general behavioral pattern" or "the general climate" in society,
as characterised by p´ rather than p, is crucial for determining judges´
behavior as well. A frequency dependent motivational factor is super-
imposed on the factor q describing the degree to which shirking judges
sympathise with unfair players.
Making the distinction between p´ and p suggests that we restate the
condition III.4 (for choosing E) in terms of p´ rather than p. As is obvious
from the derivation of the equivalent relation III.3 the population
composition affects relation III.4 only via the judges´ decision making.
Judges´ decisions rather than their types matter. Moreover, the function
ω(p´) is monotonically increasing in p´ rather than in p. The absolute
value of the conscience necessary to overcome the basic incentive to
exploit a trustful first mover becomes lesser and lesser with increasing
p´. Who is a trustworthy type in terms of her behavior can no longer be
decided by simply looking at the relation between m and r-1 in the
original game of trust. The specific value of m does matter if behavior in
the role of the second mover is affected by p´.
Taking into account the interdependence between m and p´ it seems
appropriate to allow for a mutant space with continuous type variation.
Rather than distinguishing once and for all between trustworthy and
non-trustworthy types according to the relation between m and r-1 the
line between the "behaviorally" trustworthy and the non-trustworthy
should be drawn according to the population composition itself.
To accomplish this, let us assume that the mutant set is the interval [m,
m̄] with
m ∈ [m,  m̄],  m<r-1<m̄≤0.
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m and m̄, respectively, are the strongest and the weakest form of a
conscience. Allowing for the full range of "intermediate" values for
parameter m we get the game represented in the next figure. The line
between m and m̄ indicates that we now take into account all mutants m
with m≤m≤m̄. G(m) is the population distribution based on the density
f(m). Both functions are common knowledge among the players.
As before the signalling aspects of the game may be neglected. For,
whatever inferences the first mover on his second move might draw
from observing an act of exploitation this does not affect his expecta-
tions. Judges react on behavior rather than on type even if their behavior
now depends on how they themselves would have chosen in the role of












































Taking into account our previous discussion of the case ∂=0 and a
dichotomous type space the subsequent analysis of the case ∂=1 and a
continuous type space can be applied straightforwardly to ∂=0 and a
continuum of types. The arguments for conditions of no appeal apply
with slight modifications too. Therefore we shall primarily concern
ourselves with solution play for ∂=1 under the presumption that the
condition for appeal holds good.
If the condition for choosing appeal, A, applies, then, according to III.4,
the second moving player of type m will choose E iff m>ω(p). In the
dichotomous case either m̄>ω(p) did apply or it did not. That is, either all
individuals independently of their type were trustworthy or merely the
m-types as exogenously defined by m<r-1. However, now the popu-
lation share of trustworthy individuals is itself endogenously
characterised by the behavioral parameter p´. Who is a (behaviorally)
trustworthy type and who is not, only emerges from determining the
decisions of m-types and p´ simultaneously. A player of type m ∈ [m,
m̄] is a (behaviorally) fair type if m<ω(p´). But the value of the argument
p´ of the function ω (p´) is itself derived from the type-dependent
decisions of all players. How they choose is dependent on their
expectations and the latter depend on how they choose.
A conventional rational expectations argument may be used to avoid the
circularity in the preceding reasoning from becoming vicious. Assuming
self-supporting rational expectations suggests that the players´ behavior
is guided by parameter values m*, p* with
m*=ω(p*),
the share of m-types with  m∈[m, m*) is p*,





f(m)dm = G(m*)=p*      and ∫
m*
m̄
f(m)dm =  1-G(m*)= 1-p*.
Technically, this terminology requires that m=m* is no atom of the
distribution G(.). The interval [m,  m̄] is then split into two sub-intervals
corresponding to classes of individuals who would and of individuals
who would not behave fairly. For given f(m) all types m∈[m, m*) are fair
types who choose R and all types with m∈(m*, m̄] are unfair types who
choose E in the role of the second mover.
Once the parameters m*, p* are determined the continuous is reduced to
the dichotomous case. To the fair and unfair types -- as determined
relative to a given f -- our preceding arguments about solution play
apply. In particular, the condition for appeal becomes p* ∈ ( 
-q
1-qr-C
r-C  , 1]
if 
q
1-q r < -C, while players choose Q for all compositions p*< 
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r) .
III.3.2. Evolutionary dynamics and stability
Assume discrete time t and let ft(.) refer to the type-density and Gt(.) to
the type distribution at time t. The evolutionary dynamics are then
characterised by changes of these functions through time. As before, we
shall also pay special attention to limiting states of the population com-
position.
In the preceding discussion, trustworthiness and non-trustworthiness of
players did not vary with the population composition. Now it does
depend on ft(.) how on each round of play of the evolutionary game [m,
m̄] is split into subintervals [m , m*) and (m*, m̄] corresponding to
trustworthy and non-trustworthy individuals respectively.
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Again play in the role of the first mover does not differentiate between
types. Differences in different types´ success, if there are any, must
depend on behavioral differences in the role of the second mover.
Behavior in the role of the second mover is determined by the relation




Considering p-space under the behavioral interpretation of p is not too
helpful, if meaningful at all. We therefore focus on m-space considering
several distinct generic intervals in which m* could be located. Each of
the m* itself separates two intervals of m: on the one hand, the interval
of the m<m* who choose to behave fairly and, on the other hand, the
interval of the m>m* for whom it is rational to choose unfairly given
their conscience parameter.
For constellations for which the condition for appeal is fulfilled the
threshold m= (to be introduced more formally below) separates two
realms of values of m*=ω(p*). To the left of m= are m* for which the unfair
fare better. If the interaction starts with such m*< m= then m* will tend to
decrease even more. That is, a conscience of increasing strength will be
necessary to induce fair behavior. If m* falls to the right of m= initially,
then the value m* beyond which individuals start to behave unfairly will
tend to increase. The realm where the fair are more successful is
increasing then as well -- of course, provided that the condition for
appeal holds good.
As before, it might facilitate orientation if we pre-view our results
graphically.
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              m                         m                       m               0            m*= —
Impossible   E players fare     R players fare  R players
                       better and           better and         fare better
                       m* decreases     m* increases    m* fixed
Figure 11
Distinguishing between ω(p*)∈(m,  m̄) and ω(p*)∉[m,  m̄], let us turn
now to a more detailed discussion of different "locations" of m*.
Conceivably the threshold separating the class of those m that lead to
trustworthy from the class of m that lead to non-trustworthy behavior
could in principle be located such that: m*<m, m <m*< m=,  m=<m*<m̄,
m=<m*. As a matter of convenience we shall start our discussion with the
two locations falling outside the parameter space of m, i. e. we start with
m*∉[m,  m̄], and then turn to the central case of m*∈(m,  m̄).
Case ω(p*)∉[m,  m̄]:
In this case the threshold separating the behaviorally trustworthy from
the non-trustworthy falls outside the realm of possible conscience
parameters. For reasons that will become obvious from the subsequent
discussion of the two sub-cases of this case, we can neglect the condition
of appeal if m* falls outside the space of possible values for the
conscience parameter m.
Sub-case ω(p*)< m:
0>r-1>m and 1>q>0 imply (r-1)(1-q)>r-1. Since -qC≥0 we get (r-1)(1-q)-
qC>r-1 and thus, because of r-1>m, ω(0)=(r-1)(1-q)-qC>m. Therefore, due
to the strict monotonicity of ω, ω(p)>m for all p. The premise ω(p*)<m
cannot be fulfilled.
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Sub-case ω(p*) > m̄:
If ω(p*) > m̄ then p*=1. For, if ω(p*)=m* > m̄ then all m-types choose R.
The population is behaviorally monomorphic. Since an occasional choice
of E would not be systematically related to m nothing can differentiate
between types regardless of whether or not other conditions like that for
appeal apply. Moreover, such a population could not be invaded by an
m-type behaving differently unless m∉[m , m̄]. Since the latter is
impossible by assumption any mutant type must also choose R. There
cannot be a systematic tendency towards changing the composition of a
behaviorally monomorphic population of players who all choose R.
Therefore p*=1 is stable.
In general, we have looked only at generic cases. Since for either
ω(p*)=m or ω(p*) = m̄ we are dealing with the very limits of the mutant
space some separate remarks may be appropriate. As far as ω(p*)=m is
concerned, the argument for the sub-case ω(p*)< m would obviously go
through for ω(p*)≤ m as well. If, on the other hand, ω(p*) = m̄ then all m-
types, except the m̄-types choose R. An m̄-type would be indifferent
between the choice of R and E. Since an occasional choice of E would
suffice for some type differentiation to emerge this sub-case is implicitly
treated in the discussion of the next case.
Case ω(p*)∈(m,  m̄):
Since m̄>ω(p*)=m*>m we have [m, m*) ≠ ∅ ≠ (m*, m̄]. As second movers
m-types with m∈[m, m*) choose R, while m-types with m∈(m*, m̄]
choose E. The population is behaviorally non-monomorphic as far as
choice in the role of the second mover is concerned. Therefore, as long as
there is a positive probability that first movers either intentionally or by
chance choose T this will differentiate m-types with m∈[m, m*) from m-
types with m∈(m*, m̄] according to their evolutionary success.
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For m* located within the type-space it matters, whether or not the




(1-q)(C-r)   or "appeal":
If the condition for appeal applies then success, as measured in objective
payoff, is r after playing R and w(r+C) + (1-w)1 after playing E. An m-
type who is non-trustworthy under a given density ft(.) is more
successful than a trustworthy one if
(III.7) w(r+C) + (1-w)1>r
⇔ p*(1-q)(1-r-C) < (1-q)(1-r)+ qC ⇔














Note also that the strict monotonicity of ω implies






1-r-C  and m*> m







These equivalences relating m-space and p-space should be kept in mind
when interpreting figure 11 above.
In view of III.7´ we can distinguish two basic constellations then:














Constellation (i) or "fair fares better":
Observe that 0<1-r<1, C<0, 0≤q<1 imply
(III.8)  
1-r











1-r-C , 1] is non-degenerate. For p* from this
interval we have w(r+C)+(1-w)(1)< r. In view of m̄≤0, w(r+C)+(1-w)(1)<
r implies w(r+m+C)+(1-w)(1+m)<r for all m∈[m, m̄]. Therefore,
obviously, all players irrespective of their m-type choose to play R if
constellation (i) prevails. This, in turn, amounts to p*=1. Therefore there
will be no systematic tendency towards changing that behaviorally
monomorphic population composition.
Inducing the choice of E instead of R would require a type m with m  ∉
[m,  m̄]. Therefore, if III.8 holds good p*=1 is stable.
Constellation (ii) or "unfair fares better":
As can be seen from III.7´ if 
(III.9) 1-r > - 
q
1-q C
applies then condition III.7 defines a generic interval. Notice also that for
sufficiently small |C|the condition stated as constellation (ii) and the
condition for appeal can simultaneously be fulfilled.







who behave non-trustworthy under the density ft(.) are more successful
than behaviorally trustworthy types. The density of behaviorally
trustworthy will decrease while that related to those who behave in non-
trustworthy ways increases. Under density ft+1 the share p* of those who
behave trustworthy will be smaller than under density ft. Moreover,
since ω(p*) decreases if p* decreases, the value m*=ω(p*) will be smaller
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in t+1 after a decline of p* in t. In t+1 the intrinsic motivation necessary
to overcome extrinsic incentives to behave "opportunistically" must be
stronger than in t. The type-interval is split into trustworthy and non-
trustworthy types at a point more towards m than before.
In sum, if III.7´ and the condition for appeal are fulfilled for p* the
population share of "behaviorally" trustworthy individuals will tend to
decline.
The courts will be involved in the process leading to this decline of p*
until p*=p˚=
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  is reached. But  p*=p˚ is not stable. As is shown
in the discussion of the next sub-case, independently of court action p*
will decline beyond p˚ if first movers after being exploited just quit.
Sub-case p*<p˚=
qr+C(1-q)
(1-q)(C-r)  or no appeal:
If the condition for appeal is not fulfilled, then the argument outlined in
the discussion of constellation (ii) basically applies again. As long as T is
chosen with minimum positive probability the parameter p*
characterising the population share of those m-types who act fairly will
decline. As shown in the discussion of case ω(p*)∉[m,  m̄] above,
ω(p*=0)>m . Therefore the value of m*=ω (p*) declines until a
behaviorally monomorphic population composition characterised by a
density f leading to p*=0 emerges. For all m-types m ∉ [m, ω(p*=0)] or
m>m*=ω(p*=0). Thus, all choose E and there is no further systematic
tendency to change the composition of the population. Therefore a
population characterised by a density f leading to p*=0 is evolutionarily
stable in the LESS-sense.
In sum, we can characterise evolutionary dynamics and stability for
continuous type variation in the following way now:
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If the population is behaviorally non-monomorphic initially, that






1-r-C), then the evolutionary process will
eventually yield a behaviorally monomorphic stable population
composition characterised by a density f leading to p*=0 and the
use of E by all players.
If the population is behaviorally monomorphic, then, if p*=0,
initially, a population of players who all are using E and if p*=1,
initially, a population of players who are all using R are stable.
Again our results, as compared to those for the original evolutionary
game of trust, do not suggest that a general crowding out effect exists.
Whether or not crowding out in fact can be observed depends critically
on the parameter constellation, the initial distribution f, the value of p*
implied, and, last but not least, on the bench mark process. As far as this
is concerned again attention should focus on the evolutionary game of
trust in which some type information of limited reliability is available at
some cost. Only if types can ex ante be distinguished to a certain extent,
can there be bi-morphic populations with p>0 and thus a crowding out
effect at all (cf. again figure 4 above). It is most important to note,
however, that in the region where R is universally chosen again the
courts can in fact prevent superior evolutionary success of individuals
endowed with a relatively weaker -- that is less negative -- conscience
parameter m.
The central result that the introduction of courts can per se improve
performance stands up under the behavioral as opposed to the
motivational interpretation of trustworthiness. Introduction of a court
system can improve overall performance if judges decide according to
how they themselves would behave as citizens.
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IV. Discussion
In view of formal models like the previously discussed it must be asked
how meaningful the abstractions involved are, how robust the
conclusions, how plausible the interpretations, and what kinds of
broader questions might be posed in the sequel. In our efforts to address
at least some of these issues let us start with the question of how robust
our findings are if the influence of courts is modelled differently.
IV.1. Alternative modelling of the influence of the court
It is quite plausible that intrinsic motivation is not only suspended after
being sued but rather in the very moment that formal contracting


















































1>r>s>0, 0>K, C, and  m̄ + 1 > r > m+1
Figure 12
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In this game all branches of the tree of the original game of trust show
up. The player who is to play as first mover can still choose between N,
no trust, and T, trust. Again assuming without loss of generality that
player 1 is moving first he has now the additional option of choosing D,
or of showing distrust. Distrust is different from N or refusing to interact
any further. It relies on formal contracting along with the intention to
interact in a more formal setting structured by the threat of extrinsic
intervention. A relationship that could have been framed as a (personal)
trust relationship by choosing T is framed as a contract or (impersonal)
relationship. It seems quite plausible that, after distrust is shown, not
only additional costs K of formal contracting are incurred but also that
this suppresses all intrinsic motivational factors typical of informal trust
relationships. -- Since the rest of the game tree should be self-
explanatory let us directly turn to analysis.
Without determining the solutions of the game under various parameter
constellations one can easily see that only the m̄-monomorphic popu-
lation composition with p=0 is limit evolutionarily stable. Consider first
that player 1 after being exploited would rationally choose Q. In that
case the choice of D is dominated by T for all K<0. Thus the old game of
figure 3 emerges. In this game, according to our previous results, only
the m̄-monomorphic population composition with p=0 is limit evolutio-
narily stable. This is not changed by the fact that with a small
probability, D is chosen even if non-D is the rational decision.
If D and A are chosen basically the game of figure 5 for ∂=0 emerges --
though now m is completely eliminated. With respect to strategic
choices, K is merely an additive constant that can be neglected too. As
before, different types are not differentially affected as far as their "objec-
tive" payoffs are concerned. It seems that all population compositions for
which the first moving player appeals if he comes to move again could
be weakly stable at least in principle in this case. Note however, that first
movers might make a mistake T once in a while. In that case the unfair
type of the second mover would fare better while along all other
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branches of the tree, even if slight mistakes occur, both types would do
equally well. Therefore in this tree we have only p=0 as a limit evolutio-
narily stable population composition.
It should be noted, however, that in the realm of population compo-
sitions p > p̄(C´) the courts can affect the evolutionary dynamics. In the
original game of trust with costly type information of imperfect
reliability everybody would simply show trust in the role of the first
mover. For, then the non-trustworthy are too few to render incurring the
costs of discrimination worthwhile. Thus, if p > p̄(C´) the non-
trustworthy are more successful (cf. again figure 4). In that case, for
|K|<|C´, usage of the court system can at least conceivably slow down
the elimination of the trustworthy. Instead of getting always a chance to
exploit in the position of the second mover the non-trustworthy have an
advantage only after occasional choices of T as long as the condition of
appeal applies and the courts are used after formal contracting.
Still, the occasional advantage of the trustworthy cannot be eliminated.
Nevertheless, the trustworthy are not crowded out by relying on the
courts but are rather eliminated through interaction outside the shadow
of the courts. If the framing effect exerted by the court is as described in
figure 12 courts are neutral with respect to crowding out. On the other
hand, if framing works the way assumed in figure 12 then the courts
cannot be instrumental to reducing evolutionary pressure against the
trustworthy. The courts are neutral in this respect, too. From this it is
obvious that we must hedge a bit our previous claim that the
introduction of the courts per se can work to the advantage of the more
trustworthy. What we can say, though, is the following: Introduction of
the courts can improve overall performance even if judges are no better
than the rest of society provided that players frame the situation in a
suitable way.
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IV.2. Reliance on extrinsic enforcement as a general strategy
It may well be that in the game of trust under the shadow of the courts
overt behavior better complies with standards of fair behavior than in
the game of trust where merely some type information at some cost is
available. Behaviorally monomorphic populations of individuals who all
play R in the role of the second mover may emerge in case ∂=1. This
holds good also if there is a continuum of m-types who decide on the
basis of a behavioral standard of trustworthiness. In social interactions in
which trust relationships matter relying on the courts may be preferable
to a purely moral guidance and control. Even if framing effects work
along lines as sketched in figure 12, introducing a court system at least
will not harm the more trustworthy. Even if judges are not more
trustworthy than the population at large having them can improve
overall trustworthiness.
Beyond that, the models suggest that crowding out through formal
enforcement is a real danger only if there is quite a bit of both, fairness
and unfairness. In such mixed situations in which most people quite
naturally might think that formal enforcement may be the way to stop a
further "decline of morals" the crowding out effect may in fact be a real
danger. If in such situations the cost parameter is "wrongly" set and
people rely on the courts rather than on their own information techno-
logies this may indeed destabilise a former stable mixed equilibrium
p=p̄(C´)>0 as characterised in figure 4 above. If individuals do not switch
back to their information technologies such a destabilisation may lead to
a complete "break down of morals". In fact, as our analysis of the game
of trust with some type information has shown, switching back may be
impossible after p has declined beyond the threshold of p(C´).
The argument must, of course, also be seen in light of the fact that
interactions are in general embedded in a larger context (cf. on
ebeddedness Granovetter 1985). There may be spill over effects on other
interactions. These effects will be relevant whenever the strength of the
conscience in one class of interactions is related to the strength of the
49
conscience for another kind of interaction. As psychology tells us,
similarity of interactions is important. Closeness in this sense may be
relevant for the strength of expected spill over effects. If individuals
cannot arbitrarily shift their behavioral gears, if they cannot completely
separate their behavior in different roles then such effects will be very
likely.
The factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph may lend much
greater importance to crowding out than it might otherwise have. It
should be noted again, however, that the argument from spill over
effects cuts both ways. As our models clearly show, the courts may very
well stabilise a population composition that otherwise would suffer from
a crowding out effect. In particular, they can eliminate negative spill-
over effects on other interactions deemed similar by ordinary players.
The latter somewhat speculative remark seems to coincide well with folk
psychology. For instance, if individuals make the experience that they
can get away with almost any traffic violation this is expected to have
some influence on the general climate of law obedience. It may be
necessary to enforce the law more severely in order of not inducing the
view that the law does not matter in other realms as well. Closer to our
main concerns here, those who have experienced again and again that
they cannot trust promises may change their own views on how binding
formal contracts are. Here stronger formal enforcement may be the key
to preventing the elimination of trustworthiness.
Many people are tempted to accept the preceding line of argument
throughout. But this goes too far as well. As demonstrated by our
models under certain parameter constellations relying on courts after
interacting rather than relying on inspection and type information before
interacting may have a negative crowding out effect on moral dispo-
sitions. No sweeping general claims are warranted. Studying models like
the preceding is a way to enhance our awareness of what can  happen
but it may also suggest some further thoughts.
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IV. 3 Crowding out and subsidiarity
Crowding out may be seen in a much broader perspective than indicated
so far. It is closely related to the ongoing debate about a more commu-
nitarian and a more liberal view of social organisation. With respect to
the preceding models this is borne out most clearly if we focus on two
quite distinct notions of subsidiarity. The locus classicus for the principle
of subsidiaric organisation of society is the papal encyclical quadrage-
simo anno. This encyclical states in article 79 (cf. for instance the edition
Carlen 1990):
"Still, that most weighty principle which cannot be set aside or changed,
remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy: just as it is gravely
wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order
to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do."
Or with Abraham Lincoln´s words
"The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people
whatever they need to have done but cannot do at all, or cannot do so well
for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. In all that
people can do individually as well for themselves, government ought not
to interfere."
Of course, normally private contracting would be regarded as form of
doing things for oneself without state intervention. It is regarded as fully
compatible with the subsidiarity principle then. However, as far as the
courts are seen as part of the state it is not true that people fully organise
things themselves if they do so through formally enforced private
contracting. (Noting this is also of considerable importance with respect
of interpreting the role of the subsidiarity notion in the Maastricht
treaty.)
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The ability of individuals to do things for themselves without formal
enforcement procedures and without even private contracting may be
viewed as subsidiarity in the narrow sense. We suppose that the catholic
church had this communitarian kind of subsidiarity in mind in
qudaragesimo anno. If that is so, then introducing court enforcement per
se shall crowd out other forms of social organisation. But it will not
necessarily eliminate potential advantages of trustworthy individuals.
More generally, the preceding line of argument suggests that we should
very carefully distinguish between crowding out of intrinsic motivations
or of trustworthiness and crowding out of such things as certain forms of
organising social interaction. The latter might not affect the underlying
moral dispositions at all -- at least not necessarily.
Lincoln's view is presumably closer to the classical liberal concept of
(subsidiaric) organisation of society. According to this view formal
enforcement through courts is compatible with subsidiaric organisation
as long as it is derived from private contracting. Moreover, it is regarded
as compatible with maintaining the moral motivations or dispositions of
the citizens. Clearly the German ordo liberals endorsed this view. Even
though some of them had strong catholic leanings at the same time, they
were in favor of what Franz Böhm called the "Privatrechtsgesellschaft"
(the private contract society) as a moral ideal. As our analyses show they
could well do that without having to fear that introducing private
contracting with "formal" court enforcement would per se be detrimental
to "morals" in general. It might however eliminate non-contractual forms
of organisation and in that sense lead to that kind of "coldness" that so-
called capitalist forms of organisation are often blamed of.
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Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better
still contains complete trivial derivations of formulas. The trivial parts
shall be eliminated eventually but are left in for the convenience of
checking on them more easily. After that the final formatting will be
done.
